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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the present study was to a) extend previous eyewitness research in autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) using a live and personally experienced event; b) examine whether 
witnesses with ASD demonstrate a facilitative effect in memory for self- over other-
performed actions; c) explore source monitoring abilities by witnesses with ASD in 
discriminating who performed which actions within the event. Eighteen high-functioning 
adults with ASD and 18 age- and IQ-matched typical counterparts participated in a live first 
aid scenario in which they and the experimenter each performed a number of actions. 
Participants were subsequently interviewed for their memory of the event using a standard 
interview procedure with free recall followed by questioning. The ASD group recalled just as 
many correct details as the comparison group from the event overall, however they made 
more errors. This was the case across both free recall and questioning phases. Both groups 
showed a self-enactment effect across both interview phases, recalling more actions that they 
had performed themselves than actions that the experimenter had performed. However, the 
ASD group were more likely than their typical comparisons to confuse the source of self-
performed actions in free recall, but not in questioning, which may indicate executive 
functioning difficulties with unsupported test procedures. Findings are discussed in terms of 
their theoretical and practical implications.  
 
Key words: autism spectrum disorder; eyewitness; self-enactment effect; source monitoring; 
memory 
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Recall of a live and personally experienced eyewitness event by adults with autism spectrum 
disorder  
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder that is characterised by 
a triad of impairments in social interaction, communication and flexible imagination 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It affects how an individual makes sense of the 
world around them and how they communicate with and relate to other people. Memory 
difficulties are also well-documented in the disorder (discussed in more detail below) 
allowing novel predictions to be made regarding the capabilities of individuals with ASD as 
eyewitnesses. Moreover, a number of ‘risk’ factors indicate that people with autism may be 
more highly represented in the Criminal Justice System than their 1% representation in the 
general population, as a victim, witness, or even perpetrator of a crime (e.g., Allen et al., 
2008; Howlin, 1997; Petersilia, 2001; Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005, but see Woodbury-Smith, 
Clare, Holland & Kearns, 2006). It is therefore important to understand not only how well 
individuals with ASD recall events that they have passively observed, but also how well they 
recall events in which they played an active role.  
ASD is associated with an uneven memory profile: rather than having a poor memory 
per se, some functions, including semantic memory (e.g., Bowler & Gaigg, 2008), 
recognition memory and cued recall (e.g., Bennetto, Pennington & Rogers, 1996) tend to be 
preserved, at least in high-functioning individuals with the disorder. Other memory abilities 
on the other hand, such as recalling the source of memories (e.g., Bowler, Gardiner & 
Berthollier, 2004), the spontaneous employment of organisational strategies to aid memory 
(e.g., Gaigg, Gardiner & Bowler, 2008) and the episodic recollection of personally 
experienced events (e.g., Crane & Goddard, 2008; Crane, Goddard & Pring, 2009; Klein, 
Chan & Loftus, 1999; Millward, Powell, Messer & Jordan, 2000), are often reported to be 
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diminished in ASD compared to their typical counterparts, at least when unsupported test 
procedures are used. Several studies have now explored how this patterning of memory 
affects eyewitness testimony in ASD (see Maras & Bowler, in press, for a review), however 
the pattern of findings is mixed. Some studies report that witnesses with ASD freely recall 
fewer correct details (Bruck, London, Landa & Goodman, 2007; Maras & Bowler, 2011; 
Maras, Gaigg & Bowler, 2012; McCrory, Henry & Happé, 2007; North, Russell & 
Gudjonsson, 2008, but see Maras & Bowler, 2010, 2012), and some report they make more 
errors or are less accurate (Maras & Bowler, 2011, Maras et al., 2012, but see Bruck et al., 
2007; Maras & Bowler, 2010, 2012, McCrory et al., 2007; North et al., 2008).  
Two studies to date have explored eyewitness testimony by children with ASD using 
a live event, although the event in these was passively observed rather than enacted. McCrory 
et al. (2007) used a live classroom event and reported that whilst children with ASD freely 
recalled around a third less information than typically developing children did, they were no 
less accurate with regards to the proportion of errors or incorrect details that they reported. 
Bruck et al. (2007) also reported that ASD children reported fewer correct details than 
comparison children in response to both free recall and specific questions about a previously 
witnessed magic show. Of the studies with adults, none to date have used a live eyewitness 
event, or an event in which the witness has actively participated. This is pertinent given that it 
is now well established that individuals with ASD experience difficulties in reflecting on the 
self (e.g., Crane et al., 2009, and see Lind, 2010), which extend to impairments in episodic 
memory (e.g., Crane & Goddard, 2008; Klein et al., 1999). Indeed, a number of studies have 
demonstrated that individuals with ASD experience particular difficulties recalling specific 
and personally experienced autobiographical events (e.g., Bruck et al., 2007; Goddard, 
Howlin, Dritschel & Patel, 2007). This impairment is in the absence of a personal semantic 
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memory deficit (Crane & Goddard, 2008), indicating that it is a deficit related to episodic 
memory and autonoetic awareness, rather than simply a poor memory per se (Bowler, 
Gardiner & Gaigg, 2007; Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000). These findings have led a 
number of researchers to suggest that deficits in self-awareness in ASD lead to impairments 
in episodic memory and a failure to use self-involvement to facilitate their memory (e.g., 
Crane et al., 2009; Klein, 2001; Millward et al., 2000; Powell & Jordan, 1993). If correct this 
has important implications for the eyewitness abilities of individuals with ASD. 
The role of the self in facilitating memory in typical individuals is purported to be due 
to more effective encoding by use of a highly organised structure of self-concept (Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). The self-enactment effect refers to better memory for actions that are self-
performed than actions that are observed being performed by another person (e.g., Baker-
Ward, Hess & Flanagan, 1990). Whilst self-concept inevitably plays a role in enhancing 
encoding, it has also been suggested that a self-enactment effect results from the additional 
motoric component of self-performed actions leading to more salient memory traces 
(Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1985, 1989). Given the motor difficulties (e.g., Ming, Brimacombe 
& Wagner, 2007) coupled with diminished self-awareness in ASD (see Lind & Bowler, 
2010), it may come as little surprise that a number of researchers have reported a diminished 
or absent self-enactment effect in ASD (e.g., Dunphy-Leli & Wellman, 2012; Farrant, Blades 
& Boucher, 1998; Hare, Mellor & Azmi, 2007; Millward et al., 2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999; 
Wojcik, Allen, Brown & Souchay, 2011). Russell and Jarrold (1999), for example, asked 
children with ASD, children with moderate learning difficulties (to act as IQ matches for the 
ASD group) and typically developing children to remember whether they or the experimenter 
had placed a picture card on a grid, either on their own behalf or on behalf of a doll partner. 
The children with ASD were worse than both the typically developing children and children 
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with learning disabilities at recalling whether they or the other person had placed a card onto 
the grid. Moreover, the children with ASD were actually worse at recalling which cards they 
had placed themselves compared to cards that were placed by the experimenter. 
It has been argued that individuals with ASD may not benefit from memory 
enhancement for self-performed actions because they fail to fully integrate visual and sensori-
motor signals (Wilson, Rojas, Reite, Teale & Rogers, 2007). However, Williams and Happé 
(2009) adapted a previously used paradigm by Russell and Hill (2001) to include a more 
specific test of the action monitoring deficit hypothesis. In this task, participants held a 
computer mouse and either moved it intentionally themselves, or kept hold of it whilst the 
experimenter moved it. Some of the different coloured squares on the screen moved 
consistently with the movements of the mouse, and some were moved randomly by the 
computer and thus the mouse movements on these trials were unrelated. If self-performed 
actions do not result in better encoding then individuals with ASD should show no difference 
in identifying which of the different coloured squares had moved when they intentionally 
moved the mouse themselves or whether the experimenter moved the mouse that they held. It 
was predicted that typical individuals, by contrast, who have a well-developed experienced of 
the self as an agent, should find the ‘other’ condition significantly more difficult. However, 
both groups found it easier to identify the target square when they were in control of the 
movement than when they simply felt the experimenter move it. In a second experiment, 
Williams and Happé (2009) failed to replicate Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) findings of an 
absent self-enactment effect and reported that the ASD group, as was the case with their 
typical comparisons, found it easier to monitor and recalled more of their own actions than 
those of another person.  
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Several other researchers have also reported an intact enactment effect for self- 
performed actions in ASD (e.g., Hare et al., 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Summers & Craik, 
1994; Zalla, Daprati, Sav, Chaste, Nico & Leboyer, 2010), which is problematic for an action 
monitoring deficit account. It is possible that the reported difficulties in utilising the role of 
the self in facilitating memory may be dependent on the test procedure used. Findings of 
intact semantic autobiographical memory but diminished personal episodic memory (e.g., 
Crane & Goddard, 2008) and of an increased reliance on “knowing” alongside diminished 
autonoetic awareness as measured by “remember” responses in ASD (Bowler et al., 2000), 
have led Bowler and colleagues to propose the task support hypothesis (Bowler, Matthews & 
Gardiner, 1997; Bowler et al., 2004). According to this account, difficulties in retrieval by 
individuals with ASD, as evidenced by their poorer performance compared to typical 
individuals, are largely eliminated when more support for retrieval is provided at test, such as 
that in the form of cued recall or recognition tests (cf. environmental support hypothesis, see 
Craik & Jacoby, 1996). Individuals with ASD tend not to differ from typical individuals in 
performance on these tests. 
Consistent with the task support account, Zalla et al. (2010) reported that high-
functioning individuals with ASD did not show the enactment effect for self-performed 
actions on tests of free recall, however they did show the effect on a recognition test, whereby 
both ASD and comparison groups had similarly higher correct recognition for enacted than 
observed items, with no difference between groups. Similarly, Hare et al. (2007) reported that 
low-functioning individuals with ASD did not show superior free recall for self- over other-
experienced events, but that they did show enhanced recall for self-experienced events when 
recall was cued. Lind and Bowler (2009) also observed an enactment effect in the ASD group 
when they tested participants using a recognition test. In contrast to the previous suggested 
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action monitoring deficit account, Lind and Bowler argue their findings indicate that 
differences observed in ASD are likely to be due to a more general episodic impairment 
rather than specific self-memory deficit per se. Because their task was one of recognition, 
Lind and Bowler suggested that the ASD group may have been able to utilise their intact 
semantic memory to compensate for their impaired episodic memory.  
Difficulties with monitoring the source of memories are now fairly well established in 
the ASD memory literature (see Boucher, Mayes & Bigham, 2012, for a review). With 
regards to monitoring the source of self-other memories (whether the action was self-
performed or performed by the experimenter), however, research to date paints a mixed 
picture. Some have reported diminished self-other source memory in ASD (Hala, Rasmussen, 
& Henderson, 2005; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Russell & Jarrold, 1999), whilst others have 
reported that individuals with ASD perform comparably to typical participants (Farrant et al., 
1998; Hill & Russell, 2002; Williams & Happé, 2009; Zalla et al., 2010). These discrepant 
findings may be attributable to two factors. First, as mentioned above and accountable by the 
task support hypothesis, performance in ASD tends to be diminished on free recall but 
unimpaired on recognition tests. Since the self-other source monitoring paradigms involve 
tests of recognition (“did you pick this card up or did the experimenter pick this card up?”), 
invariably the ASD group’s performance will often be better than had they been asked to 
freely recall both the action and who performed it. This type of more supportive recall test 
also reduces demand on cognitive load and executive functions, with which individuals with 
ASD are often reported to show impairments (see Hill, 2004). Second, as Lind and Bowler 
(2009) note, because of the marked difference between “self” and “other”, self-other source 
judgements are more distinct and thus easier to make than internal (whether an action was 
imagined or actually performed) or external (which of two individuals performed an action) 
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source judgments (Hashtroudi, Johnson & Chrosniak, 1989). This means that studies that 
have reported unimpaired self-other source monitoring may have simply lacked power or 
sensitivity to detect a significant difference.  
The purpose of the present study is to extend this to-date inconsistent work on 
monitoring the source of actions and the self enactment effect in ASD using a live eyewitness 
scenario. No research to date has examined how well adults with ASD recall live eyewitness 
events in which they actively participated, which is particularly important given the literature 
suggesting that this might be problematic for them. Moreover, if individuals with ASD are at 
increased risk of victimisation (e.g., Howlin, 1997; Petersilia, 2001) recall of self actions and 
actions that others perform is critical. Thus, the aim of the present study is threefold: to 
examine 1) how well adults with ASD recall actually experienced eyewitness events in which 
they personally participated; 2) whether adults with ASD show a facilitative effect of self- 
over other-performed actions of an eyewitness event, as typical individuals do; 3) whether 
they show impaired source monitoring for who performed which actions.  
Adults with ASD and their typical counterparts participated in a live eyewitness 
scenario whereby they assisted the experimenter in carrying out some first aid on a manikin-
victim. Within this scripted scenario there were a number of actions that the experimenter 
always performed, and a number of actions that the participant always performed. 
Participants were later asked to freely recall what happened, before being questioned further 
about what happened. Based on the aforementioned pattern of findings to date, we predicted 
that the ASD group would show a diminished self-other enactment effect on the free-recall 
memory phase of the interview, but that there would be no difference between groups on the 
questioning phase, which is analogous to a cued recall test procedure. Given that free-recall 
provides no cues and therefore no task support for memory recall, we also expected the ASD 
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group to make more source misattributions for whether they or the experimenter had 
performed the actions in their free recall, but not in the more supported questioning phase.  
 
Method 
Participants  
Eighteen participants with ASD (16 males and 2 females) who were formally 
diagnosed by qualified clinicians were recruited predominantly in London and the South East 
of the UK from autism support groups and societies, and from word of mouth. All ASD 
participants were diagnosed by experienced clinicians with local health authorities according 
to DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for Autistic Disorder or 
Asperger Disorder and diagnoses were confirmed for all participants by assessment with the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 1999).  
Eighteen comparison participants were recruited through local newspaper 
advertisements and comprised 15 males and 3 females who were pairwise matched within 7 
points of verbal IQ as measured by the WAIS-R or WAIS-III UK (Wechsler, 1997) to the 
ASD participants. They had no known psychiatric, developmental or neurological disorders. 
Groups did not significantly differ on age, VIQ, PIQ or FIQ (all ts < 1.15, ps > .26). Table 1 
summarises these data. Participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). None of the comparison 
participants exceeded the minimum cut off score for ASD of 32 (M = 16, Range = 4-25), and 
as expected the ASD group scored significantly higher (M = 33, Range = 21-45) than the 
comparison group on this measure, t (32) = 8.01, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.67. Participants 
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provided their informed consent and were warned before taking part in the first aid scenario 
that they were about to see a manikin posing as an accident victim so that they were not 
alarmed. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committees at 
City University London and Royal Holloway, University of London.   
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
Materials  
The first aid scenario was centred around a manikin, who was a purported car crash 
victim. The manikin was approximately 180cm in height and made of flexible grey foam, 
with facial features but no hair or make-up. The manikin was dressed as a professional male 
in smart trousers, a shirt (with a red biro in the shirt pocket) and tie, and was also wearing a 
brown belt, wrist watch and socks. In his left trouser pocket were a set of keys, and in the 
right trouser pocket was a wallet with an ID membership card inside. The manikin-victim had 
five notable injuries: 1) wounded right hand, which was represented with fake blood on the 
top of the hand; 2) burn on the left forearm, again denoted using fake blood; 3) broken right 
arm, which was twisted up into an unusual position; 4) broken left leg, which was crooked at 
an odd angle; 5) a wound to the right foot, which was visible through a hole in the sock and 
fake blood on both the sock and the foot.  
A number of first aid items were present in the same far right-hand corner of the room. 
A hazard triangle, foil blanket, red cotton blanket and green first aid box were all on the floor 
next to a table. The first aid kit contained a number of items including some bandages, band 
aids, a pad, scissors, tweezers, gloves and sterile swabs. On the table was a tea towel, some 
cling film and a fluorescent high visibility vest. The experimenter always wore the same 
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clothes and jewellery, including a scarf which she subsequently removed during the scenario 
to use as a sling. An A2-size photograph print was hung on the far wall opposite the door 
depicting a car crash, in which two cars were severely damaged following an obvious 
collision.  
 
Design and procedure  
Participants were tested individually, and to avoid spontaneous context reinstatement 
at interview the first aid scenario was carried out in a different building from the subsequent 
memory interview. Participants were informed that their task was to help the experimenter 
carry out some first aid on a manikin-victim, and that the experimenter would instruct them 
on what they needed to do. On entering the room the experimenter pointed out the picture on 
the wall and explained that the manikin-victim had been in a car crash and had sustained a 
number of injuries. The first aid scenario then followed which comprised a series of actions 
performed by both the experimenter and participant, which were balanced to ensure that the 
experimenter and participant each carried out both salient and trivial actions (see Appendix 1). 
In order to control for any potential effects of verbal scaffolding from participants receiving 
instructions for their own actions, the experimenter provided the same level of verbal 
description of her own actions as that of the participant’s (e.g., participant-performed task: 
“can you check his pockets”; e.g., experimenter-performed task: “I am just going to check if 
he is breathing”). During the scenario there were 19 scripted actions performed by the 
experimenter, and 19 that were performed by the participant (e.g., Other-performed action: 
the experimenter gets a bandage from the first aid kit; e.g., Self-performed action: the 
participant rolls the bandage up). The scenario began with an initial assessment and 
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precautionary measures (e.g., putting a hazard triangle out and checking breathing), before 
each of the injuries were dealt with in turn. Full details of the actions that occurred in the 
scenario can be found in Appendix 1.  
Event scenarios were videoed through a two-way mirror for quality control purposes 
to ensure that they all followed the script accurately, and to double-check for any 
inconsistencies from participants’ reports of what happened during their interview. Following 
the first aid scenario participants were engaged in similar unrelated tasks for around one hour, 
before being interviewed for their memory of the first aid event by a different experimenter 
from the one who carried out the first aid event with them.  
 
Interview  
Interviews followed the same standard structure recommended by government to 
professionals who interview witnesses, as outlined by the Home Office (2011) Achieving Best 
Evidence guidance. Interviews began with rapport building, and then the aims and structure 
of the interview was explained to the participant, where they were given the opportunity to 
ask questions. The interviewer explained that they should try to recall everything in as much 
detail as they could about what happened and what they could see during the first aid scenario, 
and that they should particularly try to recall the finer details of exactly who did what during 
the scenario. Participants were reminded that the interviewer did not know what happened 
and that their task was to describe the event as accurately as they could.  
The free recall (FR) phase then followed, whereby the participant was instructed to 
take their time and to recall as much as they could from the scenario. Once the participant had 
finished speaking and was waiting for the next instruction, they were asked “can you 
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remember anything else?” When they had responded to this and/or indicated that was all they 
could recall, the questioning phase began. The participant was once again instructed not to 
guess and that it was ok to say if they did not know the answer to any questions. Questions 
followed a structured sequence to probe for information pertaining to each of the actions and 
who performed them, and for descriptions of what things looked like. All participants were 
asked the same questions, but only if they had already mentioned that topic in their FR or 
previously in the questioning. For example, where a participant mentioned that they had put a 
bandage on the manikin, they were asked who had fetched the bandage. However, if no 
mention was made of using the bandage this question was not asked. Similarly, if a 
participant had mentioned that the manikin was wearing a tie they would be asked for more 
information about what the tie looked like. Questions were witness-compatible (i.e. using the 
witness’s own terminology) and were predominantly open-ended. Closed questions were kept 
to a minimum and leading and misleading questions were avoided. All interviews were video 
and audio-recorded for subsequent transcription and coding. 
 
Coding and preliminary analyses  
Interviews were transcribed and each detail that the participant mentioned was coded 
against a coding template of actions and descriptions of items and people that were present in 
the scenario. The script contained a total of 19 Self-performed and 19 Other-performed 
actions (Appendix 1). Details were only coded the first time they were mentioned. However, 
where a participant mentioned an action in free recall but failed to specify at the time who 
had carried out the action (e.g., “we put a bandage on”), this was followed up in the 
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questioning phase, and their answer to this prompting (e.g., “I put the bandage on”) was 
coded as having been mentioned in the free recall phase.  
Each detail reported was coded as “correct” (e.g., “the victim’s shirt was blue”), 
incorrect (e.g., “his shirt was red”), or confabulated (e.g., “the victim was wearing a hoody”), 
with the exception of the 19 Self- and 19 Other-performed actions, which were coded as 
correct or incorrect only (confabulations were scored separately from self and other details). 
Self errors were coded where a self-performed action was misattributed to having been 
performed by the experimenter, and Other errors were coded where the participant incorrectly 
attributed that they performed an action that was actually performed by the experimenter.  
In addition to the main scripted items, there were also a number of actions that 
inevitably always occurred (e.g., removing the band aid from its packaging, the participant 
and experimenter kneeling down etc.) Actions such as these that always occurred in all 
participants’ scenarios were scored if they were reported correctly, but were not tagged 
specifically as Self or Other. Actions that occurred only in an individual participant’s 
scenario (i.e., those that went off-script) were not scored, in order to ensure that all 
participants had an equal number of potential details to score on. In addition to these action 
details, recall was also scored for details pertaining to people (i.e., what the manikin and the 
experimenter were wearing and descriptions of the people present in the photograph of the 
car crash), objects (e.g., the first aid items) and surroundings (e.g., what the room looked like 
and the location of items). For example, the statement “Anna got the red blanket from the 
corner and I lifted his leg and put the blanket underneath it” would be coded as 1 Other-
performed action correct (got the blanket), 1 Self-performed action correct (lifted his leg), 1 
Other-performed action incorrect (saying that the participant had put the blanket under the leg, 
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when in fact it was the experimenter who had done this) and 3 correct details about the item 
and its location (it was red, it was a blanket and it was in the corner). 
A second independent rater blindly scored eight randomly selected interview 
transcripts (four in each group) against the event script and the resulting Pearson’s 
correlations between the two raters were good for each type of detail, and importantly also for 
those specifically pertaining to self and other details: rcorrect = .97, p < .0001, r incorrect = .81, p 
< .05, rconfabulations = .92, p < .001, rselfcorrect = .95, p < .001, rself incorrect = .90, p < .005, rother 
correct = .99, p < .001, rother incorrect = .92, p < .001. We also examined potential differences 
between groups in interview length, and there was no significant difference between the ASD 
and comparison groups for interview duration (ASD M = 22 mins 19 secs, SD = 6 mins; 
comparison M = 19 mins 48 secs, SD = 4 mins), t (34) = 1.36, p = .18, Cohen’s d = .51. 
 
Results 
Group differences in completeness and accuracy of recall 
Our first step was to examine differences in recall between groups and between the 
FR and questioning phases. Details were coded as being correct, incorrect or confabulated, 
and three separate ANOVAs were performed for each detail type, with group as the between 
participants factor and interview phase as the within participants factor. As can be seen in 
Table 2, the ASD and comparison groups did not differ in the completeness of their recall 
(i.e., the number of correct details they recalled), F < 1, and there was no group x interview 
phase interaction, F (1, 34) = 1.62, p = .21, ηp² = .05. That is, the ASD group reported just as 
many correct details as their typical counterparts in both the FR and questioning phases. The 
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ASD group did, however report significantly more incorrect details than the typical group, F 
(1, 34) = 11.08, p < .005, ηp² = .25, and a lack of group x interview phase interaction, F < 1, 
indicated that they did so in both FR and questioning phases. Analysis of confabulations 
indicated that groups did not significantly differ in the number of confabulations made, F (1, 
34) = 3.16, p = .08, ηp² = .09, and there was no interview phases x group interaction for 
confabulations, F < 1. Thus, the ASD group made significantly more errors (e.g., reporting 
that the first aid box was on the table, when actually it was on the floor) than their typical 
counterparts in both FR and questioning phases, but there were no significant group 
differences in the tendency to confabulate about details (e.g., reporting that they performed 
emergency resuscitation techniques on the manikin, when in fact this did not occur at all).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
There was a main effect of interview phase for the number of correct details recalled, 
F (1, 34) = 11.30, p < .005, ηp² = .25, whereby more correct details were recalled in the first 
FR phase (M = 49.32, SD = 19.41) than in the second questioning phase (M = 39.21, SD = 
13.72). This finding is unsurprising given that coding was only for new items. Interview 
phase also had an effect on the number of incorrect details reported, F (1, 34) = 41.65, p 
< .001, ηp² = .55, with significantly fewer incorrect details reported in FR (M = 3.69, SD = 
2.49) than in questioning (M = 8.75, SD = 4.17). A similar pattern emerged for 
confabulations, where more confabulations were made in questioning (M = .69, SD = .95) 
than in FR (M = .31, SD = .75), F (1, 34) = 4.86, p < .05, ηp² = .13. 
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Recall of Self versus Other performed actions  
In order to assess the pattern of recall for Self- versus Other-performed actions, we 
conducted two mixed ANOVAs for correct details for each free recall and questioning phase, 
where group (ASD vs. Comparison) was the between-participants factor, and detail type (Self 
vs. Other) was the within-participants factor. There was a main effect of detail type in FR, F 
(1, 34) = 105.54, p < .001, ηp² = .76, but no group × detail type interaction, F (1,34) = 1.44, p 
= .24, ηp² = .04. In contrast to our prediction that the self-other enactment effect would be 
diminished in the ASD group relative to the comparison group, both groups similarly 
reported more correct actions that they had performed themselves than actions that they had 
watched the experimenter perform in their FR (Table 3). A similar pattern emerged for Self- 
versus Other-performed actions in the questioning phase, however this difference fell short of 
traditional statistical significance levels, F (1, 34) = 3.10, p = .087, ηp² = .08, which may be 
related to a limited number of Self and Other details left available to be recalled following the 
FR phase. Again, there was not a group × detail type interaction, F < 1. These data can be 
seen in Table 3.  
 
Source monitoring  
Next we assessed source memory for Self- and Other-performed actions. We 
predicted that the ASD group would make more source confusion errors on the FR, but not in 
the questioning phase. As reported above, both groups demonstrated the self-enactment effect 
by reporting significantly more self- than other-performed actions, and here we were 
interested in whether both groups correctly attributed themselves or the experimenter as 
having performed each of these types of actions. Thus, we compared differences between 
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groups in the number of Self and Other errors made within each interview phase. As can be 
seen in Table 3, the ASD group made significantly more Self errors than the comparison 
group in the FR phase, F (1, 34) = 15.87, p < .001, ηp² = .32, but not in the questioning phase, 
F < 1. Groups did not differ in number of Other errors made in either the FR phases, F < 1, or 
in the questioning phase, F < 1. Thus, the only difference between groups in terms of source 
confusions (who performed which actions) was for Self-performed actions in FR. That is, 
compared to their typical counterparts, the ASD group incorrectly attributed more actions that 
they themselves had performed as having been performed by the experimenter when they 
were asked to freely recall what had happened. This difference between groups in source 
monitoring errors for self-performed actions was diminished, however, in the questioning 
phase, and there were no differences between groups in the number of source errors made for 
actions that were performed by the experimenter. Because the number of errors for self-
performed actions was quite low overall, we inspected the proportions of individuals in each 
group who made such errors. All but one of the participants with ASD (i.e., 94%) made at 
least one source error for self-performed actions. In contrast only six individuals in the 
comparison group (i.e., 33%) made this type of error.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Discussion  
The present study is the first to examine how well adults with ASD recall a personally 
experienced live eyewitness event. In recalling this event, we were interested in whether the 
ASD group demonstrated a self-enactment effect and whether they could successfully 
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monitor the source of their own and another’s actions. To this end, three main findings 
emerged. First, the ASD group’s recall was just as complete as that of their typical 
comparisons, but they made more errors. Second, both ASD and comparison groups showed 
an enactment effect: they recalled more actions that they had performed themselves than they 
did actions that the experimenter had performed. Third, when asked to freely recall what 
happened, the ASD group made significantly more source confusions than the comparison 
group in attributing actions that they had actually performed themselves as having been 
performed by the experimenter. The use of a live event in this study is novel and 
demonstrates that, from a forensic perspective, if adults with ASD are personally involved in 
a crime as a witness, victim or perpetrator, they can recall just as many correct details as their 
typical counterparts, but that their recall may be less accurate (i.e., contain more errors). 
Moreover, if they are questioned appropriately or provided with environmental support they 
can provide information about source as accurately as their counterparts. We now consider 
each of these findings in turn in more detail. 
Completeness and accuracy of recall 
With regards to the eyewitness abilities of individuals with ASD in recalling a 
personally experienced event, findings from the present study are positive in that they show 
that individuals with ASD recall just as many correct details as their typical comparisons in 
both the FR and questioning phases of interview. However, witnesses with ASD were more 
prone to making errors when reporting in both stages, despite explicit interview instructions 
not to guess if they were unsure of anything. As mentioned in the introduction, despite the 
fact that all previous studies used homogeneous samples of high-functioning adults with ASD, 
their findings regarding both the completeness and accuracy of eyewitness testimony to date 
are mixed. Our findings of similar levels of completeness of the reports of witnesses with 
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ASD to their typical counterparts are consistent with some existing studies (e.g., Maras & 
Bowler, 2010; Maras et al., 2012) but inconsistent with others (e.g., Bruck et al., 2007; Maras 
& Bowler, 2011; McCrory et al., 2007). It could be concluded from the present findings that 
individuals with ASD recall more details if the event is salient, live and personally 
participated in, but given the inconsistent findings previously reported, future work is needed 
to clarify and confirm this interpretation. Similarly, the same might be said for errors, where 
again our findings add to a mixed picture, with more errors reported by some studies (Maras 
& Bowler, 2011; Maras et al., 2012), but not others (Bruck et al., 2007; Maras & Bowler, 
2010; McCrory et al., 2007). That the questioning phase elicited more errors than the FR 
phase for both groups replicates and extends to witnesses with ASD the finding of the 
majority of existing studies that show this effect with typical individuals.  
Outside of eyewitness research, the pattern of findings remains somewhat mixed, and 
it is therefore difficult to pinpoint an explanation for the discrepant findings across studies. 
Studies of story recall by high-functioning individuals with ASD, for example, have reported 
both unimpaired (e.g., Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris & Murphy, 2006; Boucher, Cowell, 
Howard et al., 2005) and impaired performance (Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Salmond, 
Ashburner, Connelly et al., 2005; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006). It is possible that 
high-functioning individuals are inherently impaired in recalling an event, but that they 
develop compensatory strategies, for example with an increased reliance on the semantic 
memory system, to compensate for this deficit (see Boucher et al., 2012, for further 
discussion), leading to a mixed pattern of findings across studies regarding both the 
completeness and the accuracy of their reports. Nevertheless, findings from the present study 
indicate that, from a forensic perspective, victims or suspects with ASD may recall just as 
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many correct details as their typical counterparts, but that forensic professionals might seek to 
exercise caution in verifying the details that are given in an account by a witness with ASD.  
Self-enactment effect 
Contrary to our initial predictions, the ASD group showed a similar self-enactment 
effect to the comparison group in both their FR and questioning. That is, they recalled more 
actions that they had performed themselves than they did actions that the experimenter had 
performed. This is an important finding practically because it indicates that if an individual 
with ASD is the victim or perpetrator of a crime they will be able to recall what happened and 
what they did. Theoretically this finding is also important because it indicates that individuals 
with ASD do lay down a stronger memory trace for self-performed actions. Based on 
previous research (Hare et al., 2007; Zalla et al., 2010) and the task support hypothesis 
(Bowler et al., 2004) we expected that the ASD group would only demonstrate an 
undiminished enactment effect on the questioning phase, and not in the unsupported FR 
phase. It should be noted, however, that not all studies have reported a diminished self-
enactment effect in FR for ASD: Summers and Craik (1994) also reported that their ASD 
group recalled more self-performed tasks, although the comparison task in their study was a 
list of word items, rather than similar action-related tasks being performed by another person. 
The conditions in their study could therefore not control for potential scaffolding from the 
nature of a visual action-related task irrespective of whether it was self-performed or not.  
There are two interpretations of the present data. The first, and the interpretation that 
we favour, is that individuals with ASD genuinely do benefit from self-enactment and that a 
more general episodic deficit explains previous findings of a diminished enactment effect, 
whereby differences between groups are quantitative, rather than qualitative in nature (see 
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Lind, 2010). The second is that the effect is diminished in ASD, but that we failed to detect a 
difference in the present paradigm. We will briefly consider each of these possibilities in turn. 
Some have argued that action monitoring is, in fact, intact in ASD and that the difficulties 
observed in previous studies have reflected a more general episodic memory deficit, as 
opposed to a specific difficulty with personally experienced events (Lind & Bowler, 2009, 
Williams & Happé, 2009; and see Lind, 2010, for a review). Our overall findings support this 
interpretation: if it were a deficit specific to personally experienced events, then one would 
expect the ASD group in the present study to recall fewer details overall than the comparison 
group from the personally experienced event. Such a difference should be particularly 
marked given that some previous eyewitness studies that have used event stimuli that were 
not personally participated in have reported diminished completeness of recall (e.g., Bruck et 
al., 2007; Maras & Bowler, 2011; McCrory et al., 2007). Yet we found the ASD group 
recalled just as many correct details overall as their typical counterparts from this personally 
experienced event. Moreover, several studies have previously reported a self-enactment effect 
in ASD (Hare et al., 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Summers & Craik, 1994; Williams & 
Happé, 2009; Zalla et al., 2010), indicating that individuals with ASD do lay down a stronger 
memory trace for self-performed actions.  
A second interpretation is that we failed to detect a diminished enactment effect 
because of the paradigm and/or high-functioning adult sample that took part. Henderson et al. 
(2009), for example, reported age-related improvements in self-referenced memory in their 
sample of 8-16 year-olds with ASD. Thus, one might argue that participants in the present 
study might have shown diminished self-referenced memory effects earlier in development, 
but had improved to such an extent by adulthood that it was not detectable in the current 
study, possibly also because of the narrative structure of the event. Whilst we were cautious 
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to keep verbal commentary of the task to a minimum and ensured that it occurred equally for 
self- and other-performed actions, it was nevertheless inevitable in order to instruct 
participants which actions to perform, which might have enhanced encoding through verbal 
scaffolding. Williams and Happé (2009) failed to replicate Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) 
findings and reported that their ASD group did, in fact, demonstrate an enactment effect. 
Williams and Happé suggest that the discrepant findings might be related to the experimenter 
engaging the participant in more verbal commentary in their study than in Russell and 
Jarrold’s experiment. This, they argue may have led to events being encoded as self-
experienced and thus recalled accurately from memory. There is some evidence to suggest 
that people with ASD tend not to use certain forms of inner speech (e.g., Whitehouse, 
Maybery & Durkin, 2006; Williams, Bowler & Jarrold, 2012) and thus, Williams and Happé 
argue, these overt verbal descriptions of the actions at the time may have been a sort of ‘outer 
speech’ which served to scaffold performance. This is the major interpretation that we 
consider of the present data to explain the enactment effect in FR as well as questioning. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that whilst the experimenter was cautious to perform their 
actions whilst the participant attending to them, the nature of the event – designed to be more 
ecologically valid – means that we cannot rule out the possibility that factors relating to 
attention did not play a role in the enactment effect. In light of our precautions to prevent this 
happening, coupled with previous work showing that individuals with ASD do show a 
beneficial effect of self-enactment on memory, we do not believe this to be the case. It is, 
nevertheless, worth noting that a trade off between experimental control and ecological 
validity is often inevitable.  
Source monitoring of self- and other-performed actions 
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In line with our predictions, but in contrast to the findings reported above that the 
ASD group did demonstrate a self-enactment effect in both their FR and in questioning is the 
finding that they made more source errors for self-performed actions than the comparison 
group in FR. The ASD group confused more actions that they had performed themselves as 
having been performed by the experimenter than did the comparison group. This finding is in 
fact in stark contrast to some previous work (e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2009), which has reported 
the enactment effect in terms of better source monitoring for self- than other-performed 
actions in ASD. This is somewhat of a paradox within the present findings: Whilst 
individuals with ASD appear to use their self-involvement to lay down a stronger memory 
trace for their own actions (and hence recall more self than other actions), in free recall they 
are more likely than typical individuals to confuse self-performed actions as having been 
performed by the experimenter. If they are using their self-involvement to strengthen their 
memory for these actions, then it is difficult to explain why they are more likely to confuse 
the source of who performed them. However, the ASD group do not show a greater source 
monitoring confusion than their typical counterparts when questioned, and it appears to be 
independent of a more general source monitoring deficit, because we did not find the ASD 
group to be more likely to confuse the source of other-performed actions.  
So how do we explain such a finding? We only observed this deficit in source 
monitoring in FR and not questioning, and one possibility relates to executive functioning, 
which can be further interpreted within the task support framework. In the FR phase, 
participants were instructed to recall as much as they possibly could about what happened, 
without any cues from the interviewer. This requires holding a large amount of information 
of what they could remember about the event “online” whilst simultaneously switching 
attention between details in order to select what to verbally recall and in what order. The 
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instruction to report everything including the finer details of who did what increases this 
cognitive load on executive functions. Individuals with ASD have been reported to have a 
number of executive function deficits including working memory, mental flexibility 
(spontaneously switching attention between different thoughts or actions) and prepotent 
inhibition (see Hill, 2004, for a review). It is also widely observed that individuals with ASD 
can show inaccurate production and reversal of pronouns (e.g., Jordan, 1989; Lee, Hobson & 
Chiat, 1994; Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mizuno, Liu, Williams et al., 2011). The ASD group 
made more source monitoring errors for self-performed actions in FR (“tell me what 
happened and who did what”), but not in questioning (“did Anna get the bandage or did you 
get the bandage?”) In contrast to FR, questioning essentially provides task support for 
executive functions by breaking down the information that is required for recall into smaller 
segments, hence directing attention to one source, reducing cognitive load and placing less 
demand on working memory, inhibition and set shifting. Thus, it is possible that the source 
monitoring errors observed in FR simply reflect executive function deficits triggering 
pronoun confusion, rather than a genuinely diminished enactment effect.  
It is also possible that the ASD group have a more lenient response criterion than their 
comparisons and hence freely report more details that they are uncertain about. Of course, 
these are only conjectures, but it is an important area for future research to explore because if 
correct it has implications for forensic interviews in eliciting information from witnesses with 
ASD. One of the most widely-reported findings in the eyewitness literature, which police 
take on board in practice, is that FR is the optimal method of recalling an event to obtain the 
most reliable reports and that questioning, whilst eliciting more details, also results in a 
concomitant increase in errors (Home Office, 2011; Loftus, 1996). It may be the case that 
individuals with ASD, however, need more specific direction in interviews to focus their 
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recall into smaller segments and minimise demands on executive functions and thus 
potentially reduce the likelihood of source confusion errors. 
Related to an executive function account, the self-source monitoring difficulties in FR 
displayed by the ASD group might also be partly explained in the context of simulation 
theories (e.g., Gordan, 1986). These theories posit that understanding of others is achieved 
through understanding self-representations. Meltzoff (2007), for example, reports that during 
development social cognition shifts from ‘others are like me’ to a dual acknowledgement that 
whilst others can be like us, they can also be different. Recalling who did what requires the 
simultaneous understanding of the differing viewpoints of others, and might account for the 
ASD group confusing the source of self-performed actions, whilst still benefitting from an 
enactment effect in recalling more of the self-performed actions themselves. This 
interpretation is supported by findings from O’Shea, Fein, Cillessen, Klin and Schultz (2005) 
who reported that, whilst unimpaired in source monitoring for impersonal items of 
information, the ASD group had specific difficulties in recalling the source of the person-
related detail. If the distinction between self and other is less explicitly distinctive, 
individuals with ASD may have more specific difficulties with spontaneously teasing apart 
and accurately reporting the source of person-performed details on tests of FR.  
Conclusions  
Previous research has reported mixed findings across all three of our research 
questions. That is, recall of a past event, the self-enactment effect, and source monitoring. 
Our findings add to this mixed picture, but from our primary objective of the forensic 
implications regarding the abilities of individuals with ASD in recalling a previously 
participated-in event, our findings indicate that witnesses, victims or suspects with ASD are 
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likely to recall just as many details as their typical counterparts. Moreover findings indicate 
that self-involvement boosts memory for actions that witnesses with ASD perform 
themselves. However, findings also suggest that forensic professionals might seek to exercise 
caution in verifying the accuracy of details that are given in an account by a witness with 
ASD. This is the first study to look at this within an eyewitness context, and findings have 
implications for the recall of events by victims and suspects with ASD, whom by definition 
would have played an active role in the event. Of course, a limitation of this study is that, in 
contrast to a real criminal event, it would have held relatively little emotional valence. It is 
therefore important for future work to extend this using a negatively valenced event, and with 
a larger sample. Our data also indicate that, on tests of free recall, individuals with ASD may 
be more likely to verbally confuse the source of self-performed actions, which may arise 
from executive function demands. Again, given the forensic implications, this is something 
that could be followed up. 
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Table 1  
Age and IQ scores for the ASD and comparison groups (standard deviations in parentheses)  
 
 ASD  
(N = 18) 
Comparison  
(N= 18) 
Age (years) 41.11 (13.12) 
Range: 25-63 
45.94 (11.99) 
Range: 25-61 
VIQª 110.94 (11.16) 
Range: 81-123 
110.78 (12.46) 
Range: 82-128 
PIQb 106.89 (13.13) 
Range: 84-128 
108.78 (13.57) 
Range: 75-136 
FIQc 109.83 (12.12) 
Range: 81-127 
110.72 (13.55) 
Range: 77-135 
 
a Verbal IQ; b Performance IQ; c Full-scale IQ (WAIS-R UK or WAIS-III UK) 
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Table 2. Group differences in correct, incorrect and confabulated detailed reported in each 
interview phase (standard deviations are in parentheses).  
 Correct Incorrect Confabulated  
Free Recall    
ASD 46.44 (21.85) 4.81 (2.67)** .44 (.98) 
Comparison  52.19 (16.76) 2.58 (1.74) .17 (.38) 
Questioning    
ASD 40.17 (16.65) 10.11 (4.78)* .94 (1.00) 
Comparison  38.25 (10.41) 7.39 (2.99) .44 (.86) 
* p <  .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 3.  
Recall of Self- versus Other-performed actions: correct details and source confusions for each 
interview phase (standard deviations are in parentheses). 
 Self Correct Self Error Other Correct Other Error 
Free Recall     
ASD 8.78 (3.39) .78 (.73) 4.00 (3.01) 1.50 (1.50) 
Comparison  10.33 (3.45) .06 (.24) 6.56 (3.20) 1.06 (1.16) 
Questioning     
ASD 3.56 (3.13) .72 (.96) 3.17 (1.79) .94 (.10) 
Comparison  3.17 (1.82) .50 (.86) 2.17 (1.34) 1.39 (1.65) 
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Appendix 1: Summary of self- and other-performed actions in scripted first aid scenario.  
Self- and other-performed actions are denoted by (S) and (O), respectively.  
 
Assessing situation /initial actions 
The experimenter asks the participant to get (S) and put out the hazard triangle (S) the 
experimenter takes the fluorescent tabard from table (O) and gives it to the participant to put 
on (S). The experimenter goes over the manikin and says “Hello, can you hear me?” (O).She 
then taps the manikin on the shoulders (O). 
The participant checks the manikin’s trouser pockets (S) and finds keys and a 
wallet/card. The experimenter takes the card and reads out the name on it (O). The 
experimenter says “Are you ok, James?” (O) and puts her ear to his mouth to check his 
breathing (O). The participant loosens his tie (S) and the experimenter undoes his top two 
shirt buttons (O). 
 
Hand wound 
The participant gets a tea towel from the table (S) and holds it on the hand to stop the 
bleeding (S) whilst the experimenter lifts the arm (O) to reduce blood flow to the area. Once 
the experimenter indicates that the bleeding has stopped the experimenter gets a bandage (O) 
from the first aid kit (which is already unravelled). The experimenter then takes the tea towel 
away (O), and the participant rolls up the bandage (S). The experimenter wraps the bandage 
around the manikin’s hand (O) and the participant ties the knot in the bandage (S).  
Burn 
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The experimenter rolls the manikin’s sleeve up (O) and says that he has a burn on his 
arm that has cooled but needs to be wrapped in cling film. The participant takes off his wrist 
watch (S) and gets the cling film from the table (S). The experimenter opens the cling film 
and holds it out over the burn (O) and then the participant takes over and wraps it round the 
burn (S). 
Broken leg 
The experimenter says that the manikin’s leg looks like it might be broken and gets a 
cotton blanket from the corner (O). The participant lifts the leg (S) so that the experimenter 
can place the blanket under (O) to stabilise it. The participant then gets the foil blanket (S) 
and wraps it around the manikin (S) to keep him warm. 
Broken arm 
The experimenter explains that the arm may also be broken so they need to put a sling 
on it. The participant gets a pad from the first aid kit (S). The experimenter takes off her scarf 
(O), and takes the pad and puts it between the manikin’s arm and chest (O). The participant 
pulls the scarf-sling under the arm (S) and the experimenter ties it in a knot at the end (O). 
Foot wound 
There is a hole in one of the manikin’s socks, so the participant removes it to check 
for a wound (S). The experimenter takes a band aid from the first aid kit (O), and the 
participant sticks the band aid on the wound (S).  
 
 
